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Abstract: 
This study explored the relation between general knowledge and the hemispheric processing of 
metaphoric expressions in college age students. We hypothesized that prior knowledge 
influences how the hemispheres process metaphors in these individuals. In this study, 97 young 
(college-aged) adults completed a general knowledge and vocabulary test, and were then divided 
into high-knowledge/high-vocabulary and low-knowledge/low-vocabulary groups. Next, 
participants viewed word pairs consisting of conventional metaphors, novel metaphors, word 
pairs with a literal meaning, and unrelated word pairs. The first word in each pair was presented 
centrally, and the second was presented to the right visual field-left hemisphere (rvf-LH) or the 
left visual field-right hemisphere (lvf-RH), and participants indicated whether each pair was a 
meaningful expression.  Accuracy results showed an interaction between general knowledge and 
visual-field hemisphere. Low-knowledge participants were more accurate for metaphors 
presented to the rvf-LH than the lvf-RH, whereas high-knowledge participants showed no 
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accuracy differences between the hemispheres. We also found an interaction between vocabulary 
and visual field-hemisphere for conventional metaphors. Specifically, low-vocabulary 
participants showed a left-hemisphere accuracy advantage, but high-vocabulary participants 
showed similar accuracy patterns in both hemispheres.  These results suggest that young adult 
readers who have more general knowledge process conventional metaphors similarly in both 
hemispheres, whereas young adult readers who have less general knowledge may rely more 
heavily on left-hemisphere processes during conventional metaphor comprehension.  
 
Keywords: 
Metaphor Comprehension, Prior Knowledge, Right Hemisphere, Divided Visual Field; 
Figurative Language 
 
1. Introduction 
Language comprehension often requires readers to go beyond the literal meaning of a 
word or phrase, and consider its figurative meaning. For example, in English, the common 
metaphor “iron fist” refers to an individual who is very strict, rather than an individual who 
literally possesses an iron hand. Because language comprehension often relies on understanding 
figurative expressions, a more thorough understanding of how readers process these figurative 
expressions is critical to our understanding of language and reading (Grossman & Noveck, 2015; 
Hagoort & Levinson, 2014). Investigations of figurative language processing have given rise to 
several studies on neurological functioning during figurative language comprehension (e.g., 
Eviatar & Just, 2006; Mashal & Faust, 2009), often focusing on the relative contributions of the 
right and left hemispheres.  In the current study, we explore how prior knowledge affects how 
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readers process metaphors, and the relative contributions of the right and left cerebral 
hemispheres in these comprehension processes.  
Although the left cerebral hemisphere often dominates during a variety of language 
processes (Beeman & Chiarello, 1998), including word recognition (Ossowski & Behrmann, 
2015) and phonological awareness (Ugolini, Wagley, Hsu, Arredondo, & Kovelman, 2016), 
many questions remain about how the brain processes figurative language. Some of the earliest 
neurological studies of figurative language suggested a right hemisphere processing advantage, 
as patients with damage to the right hemisphere often experience difficulty processing figurative 
meanings of phrases such as “face the music” (Myers & Linebaugh, 1981; Van Lancker & 
Kempler, 1987). However, recent findings suggest a more complex relation between the 
hemispheres and metaphor comprehension. Greater left hemisphere activity has been observed 
when readers were either judging the degree of figurative meaning in a text, or its 
positive/negative connotations (Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & Kircher, 2007). Similarly, when 
individuals read words with a metaphoric meaning (e.g., hot-cold-unfriendly), greater left-
hemisphere activation is evident compared to when they read words with literal meanings (e.g., 
hot-cold-chilly) using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Lee & Dapretto, 2007). 
Other studies have suggested bilateral activation during metaphor comprehension and 
production.  For example, metaphor comprehension engages the left inferior frontal gyrus and 
both left and right regions of the inferior temporal cortex, as evidenced by fMRI (Eviatar & Just, 
2006). Other fMRI research has demonstrated that the parietal cortex is bilaterally activated 
during metaphor comprehension (Obert et al., 2014). These findings are inconsistent with 
previous accounts of right hemisphere dominance during metaphor comprehension. 
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It is possible that the extent to which the right and left hemispheres are involved in 
metaphor processing depends partly on how familiar the reader is with the metaphorical phrase. 
For example, readers need less time to process highly familiar metaphors in a lexical decision 
task compared to less familiar metaphors (Blasko & Connine, 1993; Damerall & Kellogg, 2016). 
These behavioral differences are also reflected in how the hemispheres process familiar and less 
familiar metaphors. For example, fMRI evidence has shown increased right hemisphere 
activation when readers process novel metaphoric expressions (i.e., metaphors taken from 
poetry, which the participants were unlikely to have previously encountered), but increased left 
hemisphere involvement for familiar metaphoric expressions (Mashal, Faust, Hendler, & Jung-
Beeman, 2007). The same pattern of results (i.e., a left hemisphere advantage for processing 
familiar metaphors and a right hemisphere advantage for processing novel metaphors) has also 
been observed using the divided visual field paradigm (Faust & Mashal, 2007). Interestingly, if 
participants are given repeated exposure to these novel metaphors, the hemispheric processing 
advantage shifts from the right to left hemisphere (Cardillo, Watson, Schmidt, Kranjec, & 
Chatterjee, 2012; Mashal & Faust, 2009). Further, repeated transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(rTMS) applied to the right hemisphere inhibits processing of novel metaphors, whereas rTMS 
applied to the left hemisphere disrupts processing of well-known (i.e., conventional) metaphors 
(Pobric, Mashal, Faust, & Lavidor, 2008). Taken together, these findings suggest that knowledge 
of metaphoric expressions can influence how the hemispheres process these phrases.  
 Prior knowledge may also play a role in metaphor comprehension. Kave and colleagues 
recruited young adults (mean age 25.4 years) and older adults (mean age 73.7 years) to 
participate in a study investigating the relation between aging and metaphor comprehension 
(Kave, Gavrieli, & Mashal, 2014). In this study, participants viewed word pairs and then pressed 
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a button to indicate whether the pair of words formed a meaningful expression. Although the 
accuracy for the novel idioms was too low to interpret these response times, hemispheric 
processing of conventional metaphors differed for older and younger participants. Younger 
adults showed no significant difference between the hemispheres in terms of how accurately they 
processed conventional metaphors, processing metaphors in either hemisphere with similar 
accuracy. In contrast, older adults showed higher accuracy for conventional metaphors that were 
presented to the left hemisphere compared to conventional metaphors in the right hemisphere. 
Although this was an interesting finding, the difference between age groups disappeared when 
controlling for vocabulary knowledge, suggesting that these age-related differences were due to 
differences in vocabulary knowledge between the two groups. In fact, Kave et al. (2014) stated 
that their findings showed evidence of “knowledge accumulation” in their older adults. 
According to this knowledge accumulation hypothesis, older adults have acquired a greater 
knowledge and understanding of the world (and of language) due to their greater life experience 
compared to younger adults. In this hypothesis, greater amounts of general knowledge in the 
older adults may have led to stronger links between individual words of the metaphors, which 
were then processed by the left hemisphere. With repeated exposure to these metaphors, along 
with the words and concepts related to those metaphors, close associations could more easily be 
formed between the words in these metaphoric expressions. This account seems to be in 
accordance with evidence that people may process and store well-known metaphors as if they are 
one long, syntactically complex word (Gibbs, 1994; 2015). For example, individuals who are 
very familiar with the “iron fist” metaphor may store the phrase similarly to how they might 
store the single-word unit “controlling.” In other words, for high knowledge readers, the 
individual words in the metaphor may be linked so strongly via left-hemisphere connections that 
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they process these conventional metaphors as if they were one word. Such an explanation would 
be consistent with the knowledge accumulation hypothesis, as greater knowledge of the 
metaphor and its related concepts may lead to this different pattern of processing in the left 
hemisphere compared to less knowledgeable individuals.  
 If the knowledge accumulation hypothesis is correct, one would expect that accuracy 
scores for older and younger adults would be noticeably different in Kave et al.’s (2014) study.  
Instead, the difference in left hemisphere accuracy scores for conventional metaphors seems 
small (83.4% for younger adults vs. 86.7% for older adults). Accuracy differences between older 
and younger adults were slightly greater when conventional metaphors were presented in the 
right hemisphere (85.6 for younger vs. 80.1% for older adults). Thus, older adults do not seem to 
be substantially outperforming their younger counterparts when conventional metaphors are 
presented to the left hemisphere. Instead, the younger adults appear to be outperforming older 
adults when conventional metaphors are presented to the right hemisphere. These results suggest 
that the differences in how the hemispheres process conventional metaphors between younger 
and older adults may be influenced by factors other than knowledge accumulation in older 
adults.  
 The hemispheric differences evident between older and younger adults’ processing of 
conventional metaphors in the Kave et al. (2014) study may instead be due to a decline in right 
hemisphere processing during language tasks in older adults. The older adults in Kave et al.’s 
sample ranged in age from 69-85 years.  These older participants fall well within the age range 
during which most individuals begin experiencing cognitive decline (Singh-Manoux et al., 
2012). Of particular importance for the current study, cognitive decline is associated with 
impairments in processing nonliteral language. For example, older adults with mild cognitive 
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impairment experience greater difficulty accessing and retrieving both figurative and literal 
meanings during a language comprehension task when compared to younger adults (Cardoso, 
Silva, Maroco, De Mendonca, & Guerreiro, 2014). Thus, it is possible that the greater reliance on 
left hemisphere processes for metaphor comprehension in older adults may be due to difficulties 
accessing semantic information in the right hemisphere, compared to younger adults.  
 The goal of the present study is to further examine how prior knowledge influences the 
hemispheric processing of metaphors. Whereas Kave et al. (2014) were primarily interested in 
age-related differences in the hemispheric processing of metaphors, the present study holds age 
constant (i.e., all participants were college age students) and focuses on how different types of 
knowledge (e.g., general knowledge and vocabulary) influence how the right and left cerebral 
hemispheres process metaphors.   
This experiment tests two competing hypotheses. First, if the “left hemisphere knowledge 
hypothesis” based on the Kave et al. (2014) findings is correct, then we would predict that 
individuals who have greater general knowledge will show a stronger pattern of left hemisphere 
lateralization (i.e., higher accuracy scores compared to the right hemisphere) when 
comprehending conventional metaphors compared to individuals who have less general 
knowledge in the current study. Second, if the “bilateral knowledge hypothesis” based on models 
of right hemisphere decline (Singh-Manoux et al., 2012) is correct, then we would predict that 
individuals who have greater general knowledge will process conventional metaphors similarly 
in both hemispheres, whereas individuals who have less general knowledge will demonstrate 
greater accuracy for conventional metaphors presented to the left hemisphere compared to 
conventional metaphors presented to the right hemisphere in the current study. Testing these two 
hypotheses will allow us to understand the extent to which hemispheric differences in metaphor 
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processing observed in previous research (Kave et al., 2014) depends on prior knowledge while 
holding age constant.  
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
 Ninety-seven participants (78 female, 19 male) from an urban university in the Midwest 
participated in exchange for course credit. These participants were all young adults falling with 
the normal age range of undergraduate college students (i.e., 18-22 years). All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were native speakers of English, and had no history of 
neurological damage or disorder. All participants were right-handed, as assessed by the 
Edinburgh Handedness Scale (mean laterality quotient: 0.87) (Oldfield, 1971).  
2.2. Materials 
 2.2.1. Stimuli. 
For our experimental stimuli, we compiled a list of 100 word pairs, which were grouped into four 
conditions based on their semantic relatedness: literal (messy room), conventional metaphor (iron 
fist), novel metaphor (glass river), and unrelated (wisdom wash). Thus, we use the same 
conditions as previous studies (Kave et al., 2014; Mashal & Faust, 2007) with the exception that 
we created lists of word pairs in English instead of Hebrew (as was the case in the previous 
studies). Following previous studies of novel metaphors (Kave et al., 2014; Mashal & Faust, 
2007; Pobric et al., 2008), the word pairs in the novel metaphor condition were taken from 
poetry. A full list of our stimulus items can be found in the Appendix.  
To determine the degree of semantic relatedness for the word pairs in each condition, a 
pilot study was conducted in which 72 participants (who did not participate in the main 
experiment) judged each word pair based on the pairs’ familiarity and plausibility. Following the 
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methods found in Pobric, Mashal, Faust, and Lavidor (2008), pilot participants rated the 
familiarity of each phrase on a scale of 1 (not familiar at all) to 5 (extremely familiar). 
Participants also indicated whether they believed each word pair to have a literal meaning, a 
figurative meaning, or no meaning. Descriptive statistics for these ratings can be found in Table 
1. Results from the pilot study confirmed that our literal word pairs and our conventionally 
metaphoric word pairs were rated as being more familiar than the novel metaphoric pairs or the 
unrelated pairs. A oneway ANOVA revealed a significant difference between conditions in item 
familiarity scores, F(3, 99) = 29.07, p < .001. Follow-up Tukey post-hoc tests indicated 
comparable levels of familiarity between the conventional metaphor and literal conditions (p = 
.992). However, word pairs in the novel metaphor condition were rated as less familiar than pairs 
in the literal, conventional metaphor, and unrelated conditions. (all ps < .001).  
A separate oneway ANOVA on the proportion of participants who rated each item as 
having a literal meaning also yielded significant differences, F(3, 96) = 216.97, p < .001. Tukey 
post-hoc analyses demonstrated that the proportion of items categorized as having a literal 
meaning was higher in the literal condition than in all other conditions (all ps < .001). However, 
there were no significant differences in proportion of items categorized as literally meaningful 
for the conventional metaphor, novel metaphor, or unrelated conditions.  
Proportions of items categorized as having a figurative meaning were analyzed using a 
oneway ANOVA, which revealed significant differences between these conditions, F(3, 96) = 
118.99, p < .001. Tukey post-hoc analyses indicated that the proportions for figurative meaning 
in each condition were all significantly different from each other (all ps < .001), with the 
conventional metaphor condition having the highest proportion of metaphoric meanings, 
followed by the novel metaphor condition, the control condition, and lastly, the literal condition.  
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Table 1: Stimuli Pilot Study Results 
Condition Familiarity 
Literal Meaning 
Proportion 
Figurative Meaning 
Proportion 
Unrelated 1.82 (.04) 0.1 (.02) 0.38 (.02) 
Literal Meaning 4.39 (.07) 0.85 (.02) 0.1 (.03) 
Conventional Metaphor 4.35 (.10) 0.17 (03) 0.78 (.03) 
Novel Metaphor 2.53 (.13) 0.15 (.02) 0.56 (.03) 
 
All target word pairs were matched across conditions for word length, number of 
syllables, and word frequency.  
Word concreteness was measured using a database of concreteness ratings of 40,000 
English word lemmas (Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman, 2014).  Mean concreteness ratings 
were 3.89 (SE = .14) for the conventional metaphor pairs, 3.98 (SE = .11) for the literal pairs, 
3.54 (SE = .13) for the novel metaphor pairs, and 3.46 (SE = .11) for the unrelated pairs. A one-
way analysis of variance on mean concreteness ratings revealed a group difference F(1,99) = 
4.46, p = .006, and a Tukey follow-up showed that pairs in the literal condition had higher 
concreteness ratings than the unrelated word pairs, p = .016. Importantly, however, the three 
experimental conditions (conventional metaphor, literal, and novel metaphor) did not differ in 
their concreteness ratings.  
2.2.2. Individual Difference Measures 
2.2.2.1. General Knowledge Measure. 
Our primary measure for general knowledge was a set of 25 questions (e.g., “What is the 
capital of New York?”) from Tauber (2013), which is an updated version of the general 
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knowledge question set developed by Nelson and Narens (1980). Correct responses for these 
questions served as our operationalization of general knowledge (i.e., the number of correct 
responses was used to measure each participant’s level of general knowledge). We separated 
participants into two groups: high knowledge (N =44) and low knowledge (N = 53) using a mean 
split of the number of correct responses. An independent samples t-test showed a significant 
difference with a large effect size for number of questions answered in the high knowledge group 
(M = 16.70, SE = .37) and the low knowledge group (M = 8.66, SE = .47), t(93.17) = 12.95, p < 
.001, d = 2.68.  
2.2.2.2. Vocabulary Knowledge Measure. 
Although our primary measure of knowledge consisted of the general knowledge 
questions from Tauber et al. (2013), we also explored the impact of vocabulary knowledge on 
metaphor comprehension (following Kave et al.’s 2014) study. To test vocabulary knowledge, 
we administered the adult version of the Nelson-Denny Reading Test (Brown, Fischo, & 
Hannah, 1993).  The vocabulary section consisted of 80 multiple-choice items. Participants were 
sorted into the low vocabulary (N = 48) and high vocabulary groups according to a mean split of 
their number of correct answers. The low vocabulary group (N = 48) had an average score of 
48.79 (SE = 1.65), and the high vocabulary group had an average score of 66.91 (SE = .70), 
yielding a large difference in effect size, t(63.41) = 10.09, p < .001, d = 2.06.  
2.2.2.3. Reading Comprehension Measure: 
In addition to our general knowledge and vocabulary measures, we included a measure of 
reading comprehension to test effects of reading skill. This was included to understand whether 
any knowledge-related effects we observed in this experiment could be better explained by 
reading skill rather than general or vocabulary knowledge. To test reading comprehension, we 
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used the comprehension section of the adult version of the Nelson-Denny Reading Test (Brown, 
Fishco, & Hannah, 1993). This comprehension section consisted of seven passages with 38 
corresponding multiple choice items. A mean split of the correct answers was used to divide the 
participants into high comprehension (N = 48) and low comprehension (N = 49) groups. An 
independent samples t-test on the number of correct answers indicated a significant difference 
with a large effect size between the high comprehension group (M = 33.18, SE = .23) and the low 
comprehension group, (M = 22.51, SE = .65), t(58.32) = 11.10, p < .001, d = 2.26.  
2.3. Procedure 
 This experiment utilized the divided visual field paradigm, which allows stimuli to be 
presented to either the right visual field-left hemisphere (lvf-RH) or the right visual field-left 
hemisphere (rvf-LH) in isolation (Bourne, 2006). To run the experiment, we used E-Prime 
software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).  
Each participant was presented with 100 word pairs, with the first word presented 
centrally and the second (target) word presented rapidly to the right visual field-left hemisphere 
(rvf-LH) or the left visual field-right hemisphere (lvf-RH). Participants received instructions to 
focus on a blue asterisk (*) in the center of the screen for 2,500 ms, which signaled the onset of a 
trial. After the asterisk, participants saw the first word for 900 ms and read it silently to 
themselves. This was followed by a fixation plus (+) for 200 ms in the center of the screen, with 
participants focusing on the fixation plus for the entire time that it was on the screen. After the 
fixation plus, participants were presented with the target word for 180 ms at 2.8 degrees to the 
right or left of the center of the screen. After reading the target, participants indicated via button 
press whether or not the first and second word formed a meaningful expression. Target word 
presentation and hand use were counterbalanced across experimental versions (Bourne, 2006).  
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To familiarize themselves with the procedure, participants completed a practice session before 
the main experiment.  
After completing the experimental task, participants completed the general knowledge, 
vocabulary, and reading comprehension measures. Participants received 10 minutes to complete 
the general knowledge test, 15 minutes for the vocabulary test, and 20 minutes for the 
comprehension test.  
3. Results 
 For all three of our individual difference measures (general knowledge, vocabulary, and 
reading comprehension), we conducted repeated measures ANOVAs with the individual 
difference measure and visual field of presentation as the independent variables, and with 
response times and accuracy rates as the dependent variables. Prior to analyses, we removed the 
top 1% and bottom 1% of response to minimize the influence of outliers (Ratcliff, 1993). 
Descriptive statistics for response times to the target words and accuracy as a function of general 
knowledge and visual field-hemisphere are presented in Table 2. We present these results by 
condition (Conventional Metaphor, Literal, Novel Metaphor, and Unrelated). 
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Stimuli Response Time and Accuracy by General 
Knowledge  
  Accuracy Response Time 
Stimuli Condition 
High 
Knowledge 
Low 
Knowledge High Knowledge Low Knowledge 
Conventional rvf-LH .86 (.18) .85 (.13) 837.82 (120.16) 894.48 (117.90) 
Conventional lvf-RH .87 (.14) .79 (.16) 878.02 (125.05) 954.41 (144.22) 
Literal rvf-LH .94 (.16) .92 (.08) 785.07 (121.78) 861.83 (122.75) 
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Literal lvf-RH .91 (.16) .90 (.10) 846.85 (132.82) 894.21 (143.56) 
Novel rvf-LH .19 (.18) .23 (.23) 979.76 (169.11) 1039.71 (183.147) 
Novel lvf-RH .20 (.18) .23 (.22) 1021.68 (169.74) 1032.03 (173.37) 
Unrelated lvf-RH .93 (.16) .88 (.18) 967.70 (147.49) 991.78 (182.98) 
Unrelated rvf-LH .91 (.16) .91 (.19) 971.14 (173.37) 1011.82 (184.64) 
Note: rvf-LH refers to the right visual field-left hemisphere, and lvf-RH refers to the left 
visual field-right hemisphere. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
3.1. Conventional Metaphors 
3.1.1. Accuracy. 
See Figure 1 for a comparison of accuracy scores for conventional metaphors. A repeated 
measures ANOVA with general knowledge (high, low) and visual field-hemisphere (lvf-RH, rvf-
LH) as the independent variables and accuracy as the dependent variable revealed no main 
effects for the presentation of hemisphere, F(1,95) = 2.22, MSe = .14, p = .139. However, we did 
observe a significant interaction between general knowledge and hemisphere, F(1, 94) = 6.05, 
MSe = .14, p = .016.  Follow-up paired samples t-tests revealed that accuracy was lower in the 
right hemisphere than the left for low knowledge participants, t(52) = 2.57, p = .013. However, 
there was no difference in accuracy between the hemispheres for high knowledge participants, p 
= .418. Further, independent samples t-tests revealed that accuracy rates for the right hemisphere 
were higher in high knowledge participants compared to low knowledge participants, t(95) = 
2.78, p = .007. We did not, however, observe significant differences between the high and low 
knowledge participants for accuracy rates of conventional metaphors presented to the left 
hemisphere, p = .924.   
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Figure 1. Proportion correct for conventional metaphor pairs. Note: rvf-LH refers to right visual 
field-left hemisphere; lvf-RH refers to left visual field-right hemisphere   
When using vocabulary (high, low) and visual field-hemisphere (rvf-LH, lvf-RH) as 
independent variables, we detected a main effect of vocabulary for conventional metaphor 
accuracy, where higher vocabulary participants were more accurate (M = .89, SD = .12) than low 
vocabulary participants (M = .79, SD = .18), F(1, 95) = 16.53, p < .001. The main effect for 
visual field-hemisphere was not significant, p = .09. There was no an interaction between 
vocabulary and visual field-hemisphere, however, the results were in the same direction as those 
for the general knowledge, in other words, low vocabulary participants showed more left-
hemisphere lateralization than high vocabulary participants, p = .127.  
We also explored conventional metaphor accuracy using Reading Comprehension (high, 
low) and visual field-hemisphere (lvf-RH, rvf-LH) as independent variables. However, no main 
effects of reading comprehension or interactions between comprehension and visual field-
hemisphere emerged from this analysis.  
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See Figure 2 for a comparison of conventional metaphor response times. We used a repeated 
measures ANOVA with general knowledge (high, low) and visual field-hemisphere (lvf-RH, rvf-
LH) as the independent variables and response time for conventional metaphors as the dependent 
variable. We detected a main effect of visual-field hemisphere, such that individuals processed 
conventional metaphors more quickly when presented to the left hemisphere, regardless of prior 
knowledge, F(1, 95) = 24.68, p < .001, MSE = 120548.83.  Further, we detected a significant 
main effect of general knowledge, with high knowledge participants processing conventional 
metaphors more quickly than low knowledge participants regardless of hemisphere of 
presentation, F(1, 95) = 7.67, p = .007, MSE = 212789.01. However, we did not observe an 
interaction between general knowledge and visual field-hemisphere, p = .33.  
 
Figure 2. Response times (in milliseconds) for conventional metaphor pairs. . Note: rvf-LH 
refers to right visual field-left hemisphere; lvf-RH refers to left visual field-right hemisphere.  
 We also tested response time for conventional metaphors as a function of vocabulary and 
visual field-hemisphere, and a separate analysis using reading comprehension and visual-field 
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hemisphere as independent variables. These analyses did not indicate any significant main 
effects or interactions for these two individual differences.  
3.2. Novel Metaphors 
 Accuracy for novel metaphors was generally low, and we did not observe any main 
effects or interactions when using general knowledge as an individual difference measure. 
Because accuracy was well below chance (M = .21, SD = .21) we elected to not analyze response 
times further for novel metaphors (Pobric et al., 2008), nor did we explore any other individual 
differences.  
3.3. Literal Word Pairs 
 3.3.1. Accuracy. 
See Figure 3 for a comparison of accuracy scores for literal word pairs. A repeated measures 
ANOVA with general knowledge (high, low) and visual field-hemisphere (lvf-RH, rvf-LH) as 
the independent variables and literal word pair accuracy as the dependent variable revealed a 
main effect of hemisphere; literal pairs were processed more accurately in the left than the right 
hemisphere, F(1, 95) = 6.19, MSe = .04, p = .015. However, we did not observe a main effect of 
general knowledge, p = .53, nor did we observe an interaction between prior knowledge and 
hemisphere of presentation, p = .60.  
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Figure 3. Proportion correct for literal word pairs. Note: rvf-LH refers to right visual field-left 
hemisphere; lvf-RH refers to left visual field-right hemisphere  
 Using vocabulary (high, low) and visual field-hemisphere (lvf-RH, rvf-LH) as 
independent variables, we observed a significant main effect of hemisphere, with accuracy being 
higher in the rvf-LH (M = .93, SD = .12) than the lvf-RH (M = .90, SD = .13), F(1, 95) = 5.97, 
MSe = .006, p = .016.     There was also a main effect for vocabulary: accuracy was higher for 
high vocabulary participants (M = .94, SD = .08) than for low vocabulary participants (M = .89, 
SD = .15), F(1, 95) = 4.01, MSe = .024, p = .048. There was no interaction between vocabulary 
and visual field-hemisphere. p = .745. 
 We also conducted an ANOVA with reading comprehension (high, low) and visual field-
hemisphere (rvf-LH, lvf-RH) as independent variables, but found no significant effects. 
 3.3.2. Response Time. 
See Figure 4 for a comparison of response times for literal world pairs. A repeated measures 
ANOVA with general knowledge (low, high) and visual field-hemisphere (rvf-LH, lvf-RH) as 
independent variables revealed a main effect for visual field-hemisphere, as literal pairs were 
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processed more quickly when presented to the left hemisphere than the right, F(1, 95) = 27.64, 
MSe = 106565.51 p < 001.  We also observed a main effect for general knowledge, as high 
knowledge participants processed literal pairs faster than low knowledge participants, F(1, 95) = 
6.10, MSe = 30370.62, p = .015. We did not detect an interaction between knowledge and visual 
field-hemisphere, p = .10.  
 When exploring the influence of vocabulary (high, low) and visual field-hemisphere (rvf-
LH, lvf-RH) on response time for literal word pairs, we observed no effects of vocabulary or 
interactions between vocabulary and visual field. Similarly, in a separate analysis, we found no 
main effects of reading comprehension or interactions between reading comprehension and 
visual field on responses times for literal word pairs.  
  
Figure 4. Response time (in milliseconds) for literal word pairs. Note: rvf-LH refers to right 
visual field-left hemisphere; lvf-RH refers to left visual field-right hemisphere   
3.4. Unrelated Word Pairs.  
We did not detect any main effects or interactions in terms of either response time or 
accuracy for processing unrelated word pairs.  
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3.5. Contrasting Conventionally Metaphoric and Literal Word Pairs 
To contrast response times and accuracy rates for items in the conventional metaphor 
condition and the literal condition, we conducted a 2x2x2 Mixed ANOVA with knowledge 
(high, low) as the between-subjects factor, and visual field-hemisphere (rvf-LH, lvf-RH) and 
condition (conventional metaphor, literal) as the within-subjects factors.  
3.5.1. Accuracy. 
 With accuracy as the dependent variable, the Mixed ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction between knowledge, visual field-hemisphere, and condition, F(1, 95) =4.88, p = .049.  
We then used a series of paired-samples t-tests to explore the interaction, using a Bonferroni 
correction to adjust the alpha level to .0125.  For low knowledge participants, accuracy scores 
were higher when stimuli were presented to the rvf-LH than the lvf-RH, regardless of condition 
(all ps < .01). However, for high knowledge participants, there was no difference in accuracy 
scores between conventional metaphors and literal pairs in the lvf-RH (p = .10), but accuracy 
was higher for literal pairs compared to conventional metaphors when presented to the rvf-LH, p 
< .001.  
3.5.2. Response Time. 
With response time as the dependent variable, the Mixed ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction between knowledge, visual field-hemisphere, and condition, F(1, 95) = 3.71, p = 
.038. We then used a series of paired-samples t-tests to explore the interaction, using a 
Bonferroni correction to adjust the alpha level to .0125.  Low knowledge participants processed 
all items more quickly when presented to the rvf-LH than the lvf-RH, regardless of stimulus 
condition (all ps < .001). High knowledge participants showed the same trend for faster 
processing of literal than conventionally metaphoric items in the rvf-LH (all ps < .01), although 
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the difference between conditions tended to be smaller for high knowledge participants 
(31.18ms) compared to low knowledge participants (60.21ms).  
3.6. Item Difficulty 
 Although a direct comparison of metaphoric to literal items is not the primary goal of this 
study, the longer response times for conventionally metaphoric items relative to literal items 
raises the possibility that the conventional metaphors may be more difficult to process than the 
literal items. Indeed, we observed positive correlations between response time and accuracy for 
both the conventionally metaphoric condition (r = .87, p < .001) and the literal condition (r = .73, 
p < .001). This positive correlation reflects a speed-accuracy tradeoff, a well-known 
phenomenon in response time research (see Heitz, 2014, for a review). Because response times 
tended to be longer in the conventionally metaphoric condition than in the literal condition, one 
potential concern is that the pattern of accuracy differences for the two conditions in either 
hemisphere may be due to item difficulty rather than to the figurativity.    
 To test for the possibility of difficulty as a confounding influence, we calculated 
difference scores by subtracting accuracy in the lvf-RH from accuracy in the rvf-LH for each 
item in the literal and conventional metaphor conditions. Positive scores indicate greater relative 
accuracy for rvf-LH presentation, and negative scores reflect greater accuracy for lvf-RH 
presentation. These difference scores were then compared to response times using a Pearson 
bivariate correlation. There was a slight positive correlation between literal items and the 
difference score, suggesting that longer response times were associated with greater accuracy in 
the rvf-LH, however, this correlation was not significant, r(25) = .174, p = .41. There was a 
slight negative correlation between conventional metaphors and the difference score, suggesting 
that longer response times were associated with greater accuracy in the lvf-RH, but again, the 
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correlation was not significant, r(25) = -.265, p = .211.  Because response times are not 
significantly correlated with accuracy difference scores for items in either condition, we do not 
find any evidence that the observed hemispheric differences in accuracy between literal and 
conventionally metaphoric items were due to greater difficulty of the conventional metaphors. 
4. Discussion 
 The results of our experiment present several intriguing findings about how prior 
knowledge influences the hemispheric processing of conventional metaphors. We observed that, 
when processing conventional metaphors, high knowledge participants showed similar accuracy 
levels regardless of the hemisphere to which the word pairs were presented. In contrast, low-
knowledge participants showed hemispheric asymmetry when processing conventional 
metaphors. Specifically, accuracy for conventional metaphors was lowest for low knowledge 
participants during the left visual field-right hemisphere trials compared to all other conditions. 
This interaction between knowledge level (high vs. low) and visual field-hemisphere supports 
the hypothesis that general knowledge may influence how the hemispheres process common 
English metaphors. Further, a lack of effects related to reading comprehension help to ensure that 
these effects for metaphor processing reflected differences in knowledge rather than differences 
in reading skill.  
 The current results suggest that individuals with more knowledge may process 
conventional metaphors differently in their right hemisphere compared to less knowledgeable 
individuals. This individual difference may help explain why some prior research has found no 
special role for the right hemisphere in processing conventional metaphors (e.g., Rapp et al., 
2007) while other research has suggested bilateral involvement in conventional metaphor 
processing (Eviatar & Just, 2006). Perhaps some participants in these prior studies may have 
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been more knowledgeable than participants in other studies, which may explain why right 
hemisphere has shown more evidence for involvement in some studies than in others.  
 Why would high and low knowledge participants show similar processing patterns for 
conventional metaphors in the left hemisphere, but not the right? The accuracy differences 
observed may reflect differences in how semantic information is stored in the right and left 
hemispheres. According to the Coarse Coding Hypothesis (Jung-Beeman, 2005), the right and 
left hemispheres carry out qualitatively different functions during text comprehension. 
According to this hypothesis, neuronal connections in the language areas of the left hemisphere 
are densely connected to a few neighboring neurons. In contrast, right hemisphere areas 
associated with language comprehension tend to have more connections to more distant neurons, 
but these connections are less dense than in the corresponding left-hemisphere areas. Beeman 
theorizes that during text comprehension, the left hemisphere is more likely to activate semantic 
information that is semantically “close” to the word or phrase being processed, while the right 
hemisphere is more likely to activate semantically “distant” information. These processes are 
important when readers process metaphors, as metaphor comprehension often involves 
integrating knowledge from various domains (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Cacciari & Glucksberg, 
1994). As such, it may be the case that high-knowledge readers, who possess more information 
about the world, can better process the figurative meaning of novel metaphors using distant 
semantic relations compared to low-knowledge readers. There is currently a dearth of research 
testing interactions between prior knowledge and fine-coarse semantic coding (with the 
exception of Kave et al., 2014), however, our findings point to the possibility that general 
knowledge may influence how the hemispheres process figurative language. 
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 Although the accuracy patterns for conventional metaphors demonstrated an interaction 
between general knowledge and visual field-hemisphere, the novel metaphors show a less clear 
pattern. Because accuracy rates for the novel metaphors in our study were well below chance, we 
did not interpret this data. These low accuracy rates may be surprising given that participants in 
our pilot study rated the novel metaphors as being more meaningful than our unrelated word 
pairs, but previous researchers have also noted low accuracy rates for novel metaphors (e.g. 
Pobric et al., 2008). Similarly, when Kave et al, (2014) presented novel Hebrew metaphors to 
Hebrew-speaking participants, accuracy rates were also low. However, other studies using novel 
metaphors in Hebrew have yielded higher accuracy rates (Mashal & Faust, 2007). One 
possibility is that processing novel metaphors may be very difficult in English without proper 
context (Clark, 1992; 1996). Presenting novel metaphors with a greater amount of context may 
improve participants’ understanding that these novel metaphors are meaningful phrases (as 
opposed to the unrelated pairs in our control condition). Further, it may be that novel metaphor 
comprehension requires a greater amount of time than the present study and Kave et al. (2014) 
used. If so, this could help explain why participants in our pilot study found more meaning in the 
novel metaphors (i.e., our pilot study was not constrained by time and thus allowed participants 
ample opportunity to comprehend the novel metaphors). It may be useful for future studies to 
systematically vary the stimulus onset asynchrony between the two stimuli words in each pair to 
better understand the time course of novel metaphor comprehension. It is also possible that 
readers may need more context to make sense of novel metaphor word pairs. Future studies 
could explore this by including preceding context which would help the reader understand the 
intended meaning. 
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 Since our materials and methods were based closely on Kave et al.’s (2014) study on 
metaphor processing and aging, our results may shed more light on their previous findings. In 
Kave et al.’s study, younger participants showed similar patterns of activation in their right and 
left hemispheres during a divided visual field task, but older adults had lower accuracy rates in 
their right compared to their left hemispheres. As these age-related accuracy differences seemed 
to be negated when vocabulary knowledge was accounted for, Kave et al. suggested that a 
“knowledge accumulation hypothesis” could explain the differences between the older and 
younger adults. Our current findings support a role for prior knowledge in metaphor processing, 
but it seems as if high levels of knowledge are associated with bilateral metaphor processing, and 
asymmetric processing of metaphors is associated with low knowledge levels. Thus, it is possible 
that the left hemisphere asymmetries demonstrated by Kave et al.’s older participants may be due 
not to knowledge accumulation, but rather due to processing changes associated with cognitive 
decline, especially considering the advanced age of Kave et al.’s older participants. For example, 
cognitive decline may result in semantic information becoming less accessible to right 
hemisphere processes, a view that is compatible with the right-hemisphere decline model of 
aging (Orbelo et al., 2005). Future research may wish to test older adults who are cognitively 
typical vs. those who show evidence of cognitive decline to better understand what role (if any) 
cognitive decline may play in metaphor comprehension.  
 In summary, our results provide evidence that general knowledge may play a role in 
metaphor comprehension, with greater amounts of general knowledge being associated with 
more bilateral processing for conventional metaphors, and less general knowledge being 
associated with hemispheric asymmetries during metaphor processing. These results demonstrate 
the critical role of prior knowledge in understanding figurative language. Our results also provide 
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further evidence that the extent to which the hemispheres process conventional metaphors 
depends on the readers’ prior knowledge, with high knowledge leading to more accurate 
processing in the right hemisphere.  
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Appendix  
Experimental Word Pair Lists 
Conventional Metaphor Word Pairs 
sunny disposition 
sly fox 
smoking gun 
iron fist 
moral compass 
half baked 
bitter end 
cabin fever 
butter fingers 
boiling mad 
wet blanket 
rug rats 
couch potato 
melting pot 
angry sea 
cold feet 
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blind eye 
dark thoughts 
lightning reflexes 
smooth sailing 
bubbly personality 
foggy memory 
broken heart 
bright student 
warm welcome 
 
Novel Metaphor Word Pairs 
fresh courage 
impatient machinery 
shivering life 
icy clean 
fragrant shadow 
nuclear anger 
unkempt afternoon 
happy dawn 
blank sleep 
sharp scent 
tender sky 
nodding leaves 
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stiff noise 
braided freeway 
mad slap 
hungry mind 
crooked math 
burning moment 
dry buzz 
lonely oval 
molten sound 
rotting education 
gentle art 
glass river 
silent wound 
 
Literal Word Pairs 
salty food 
lazy cats 
damp soil 
spring flower 
sticky glue 
red apple 
fragile statue 
tiny speck 
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soft coat 
dull knife 
white snow 
yellow sun 
messy room 
wooden spoon 
unjust law 
cloudy weather 
corrupt politician 
shiny metal 
old ruins 
hot fire 
depressed teenager 
new computer 
friendly dog 
fast car 
plastic bag 
 
Unrelated Word Pairs 
guilt current 
funny acid 
young budget 
polite bay 
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unfair beef 
evil ticket 
joint tire 
divine node 
financial smell 
radical dock 
worried pan 
high organ 
southern release 
fair jacket 
instrument island 
automatic slab 
petty balloon 
result rice 
wisdom wash 
intern knight 
aware base 
success carpet 
prime train 
eager trophy 
humble lock 
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Highlights: 
-We used the divided visual field technique to present metaphors to the right and left hemispheres 
-Participants were divided into high- and low-knowledge groups 
-High knowledge groups showed similar accuracy for metaphors in both hemispheres 
-Low knowledge group showed left-hemisphere bias for metaphor accuracy 
-Results suggest relationship between general knowledge and hemispheric processing of metaphors 
 
